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The use of radar information for collision avoidance is common, however it is effective only for
constant values of shipmotion parameters. As information delays or information errors occur, it
is reasonable to supplement the informationderived fromradarwithanother information system.
An ideal system should operate automatically and continuously. A system that appears to be suit-
able to provide this kind of information is theAutomatic Identification System (AIS), whichmay
be classified as a radio communication system that uses radio waves to transmit datawith regard
to ship motion parameters. In this paper the topic of integrity and completeness of AIS infor-
mation is discussed and the research results for the completeness and integrity of dynamic infor-
mation are presented. In addition, the outcomes ofAIS information correctness from theGulf of
Gdańsk were compared with studies carried out in the Baltic Sea, east of Bornholm, between
Trelleborg and Arkona. The results of research for AIS dynamic information with the highest
completeness (Position, Course over Ground and Speed over Ground) are presented. The re-
search outcomes presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that AIS could deliver useful sup-
plementary information in the process of collision avoidance.
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1. BACKGROUND. One of the most effective methods to assess the dynamic
parameters of ship motion is radar information. However, radar information is con-
strained by significant limitations. In practice, the position error for a navigation
radar is not less than 30 metres. The use of radar information for collision avoidance
is effective only for constant values of ship movement (S´niegocki, 2002). Radar and
Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) are limited by weather conditions and
target manoeuvres. Detection of small objects is limited by sea clutter and unfavour-
able weather conditions. They also have a minimum range of detection, radar
shadow effect and wave reflection. Radar information, usually presented in a polar
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coordinate system, is subject to measurement error of at least 1% of radar range and 1°
of true bearing. Therefore, it appears rational to supplement the information derived
from radar with additional information. A system that is claimed to be tailored to per-
forming this task is AIS, delivering proper information automatically and continuously
with accuracy of the information comparable to Global Navigation Satellite Systems
(GNSS) (Felski and Jaskólski, 2013).
2. ANALYSIS OF AIS AS A SOURCE OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FROM A COLLISION AVOIDANCE POINT OF VIEW. AIS uses radio waves
to transmit data of ship motion parameters and can deliver more accurate information
than radar information, however for many watchkeeping officers it often looks less re-
liable than own radar information (Felski and Jaskólski, 2012a; Felski and Jaskólski,
2012b). Use of AIS has led to the emergence of opinions on the imperfections of the
system related to the lack of transmission or the transfer of unreliable information.
Studies on the incompleteness and integrity of AIS information published to date
are generally linked to the position reports (Message no. 1) and static and
voyage-related data (Message no. 5). This problem was analysed, for example by
Harati‐Mokhtari et al. (2007), Bailey (2005) and Hori et al. (2009).
One of the methods of statistical analysis of AIS information unfitness was pre-
sented by Harati‐Mokhtari et al. (2007). The authors defined the types of mistakes
and errors made by AIS users. Statistical analysis of AIS information quality is
based on the modification of the reliability system model referred to as the “Swiss
Cheese Model”. It was estimated that at least 80% of all recorded maritime accidents
resulted from human errors. Therefore, the contribution of human error as the main
factor leading to the increased number of maritime accidents was studied over a ten-
year period 1991–2001. The most frequently occurring incorrect AIS information
was a numeric string instead of destination and country name instead of port name.
There were cases when Exact Time of Arrival (ETA) or destination field was reported:
“not available”, “not defined”, or blank.
In 2005, similar research on AIS information was conducted in the Dover Strait,
which is a high traffic intensity channel area, requiring reliable and complete naviga-
tional information. The research was conducted by Dover Coastguard Channel
Navigation Information Service (CNIS), at the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) area,
over a seven day period (Bailey, 2005). Studies on reliability and completeness of
AIS information were conducted by comparing two sources of information. Static in-
formation and voyage related datawere comparedwith verbal information reported on
Very High Frequency (VHF) Channel 11 to VTS operators upon entering and leaving
the VTS area. It was assumed that information transmitted by radiotelephone was
reliable, whereas AIS information might contain errors. Research details were
divided into categories depending on transmitted information and it was shown that
more than 50% of AIS ship destination information was incorrect. Almost the same
results were obtained with draught however information about for example
call signs, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) and Course was incorrect in
only 5%.
In addition, the Bailey research provided information on AIS dynamic data errors.
In this area, course and speed information errors were observed. When applying
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comparison methods it is possible to examine the quality of AIS dynamic data by com-
paring it with VTS (radar) dynamic information. However, this methodology may be
questioned, since the accuracy of course and speed determined by VTS sources has a
relatively poorer quality than that from Global Positioning System (GPS) sensors. In
five cases, the difference in course between shore radar and AIS dynamic information
amounted to 180°. Presumably, the deviation concerned two different ships considered
to be one ship and mistakes were made by VTS operators.
The knowledge of AIS information integrity is relatively low and therefore it can
hardly be considered objective. It should be taken into consideration that the knowl-
edge was obtained in the period of rapid implementation of the system. This resulted
in a lack of operator training on AIS maintenance and it is potentially the source of
many cases of improper system operation. Efficiency of navigation systems, including
AIS, can be assessed using the value of processed information error. The errors are
related to incorrectly reported position, course, speed or non-quantitative factors i.e.
human factor errors.
It is important to remember that the abovementioned publications were prepared in
the early stages of AIS implementation. In this context more interesting research in the
area of navigation characteristics of AIS information was presented by Banyś et al.
(2012). The analysis of AIS data sets describing the vessel traffic of the Baltic Sea
led to a conclusion that specific parameters with relevance to navigation seemed to
be defective or implausible. Essentially, it concerned the Heading (HDG) and the
Rate Of Turn (ROT) parameters. The AIS data used in that analysis was recorded
in September 2011 and covered vessel traffic in the Baltic Sea in the proximity of
the north coast of Germany. It comprised the harbour area that included the Port
of Rostock and its approaches and the sea area located in the Baltic Sea, east of
Bornholm, between Trelleborg and Arkona (Figure 1).
All AIS data was provided by the German Federal Waterway Authority as a query
from the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) AIS database server. The complete one-
month AIS dataset included Class A aswell as Class B data messages. Every AIS trans-
mission of Message types 1, 2 and 3 (dynamic position report Class A), 5 (static and
voyage related data Class A), 18 (standard Class B equipment position report) and
19 (extended Class B equipment position report) were counted and placed into the cor-
responding geographic category. In the harbour area around 65% of the messages were
unaffected. This means that around 35% of all AIS messages had one or more
unknown values of the seven analysed variables. At 8% a significantly smaller percent-
age of transmitters had trouble sending dependable Speed Over Ground (SOG) and
Course Over Ground (COG) data. Figure 2 shows that approximately 88% of the
AIS messages with unknown values of ROT and HDG occurred when the SOG was
less than 1 kn.
It is important that 12% of the unknown values were sent by vessels moving at speed
between 1 kn and 10 kn. Considering the overall results for ROTand HDG (28% of the
affected messages) about 3% of the data can be declared crucial for the assessment of
traffic situation, because of the movement of the vessels. For SOG lower than 1 kn,
nearly 27% of all vessels contribute to the broadcasts of incomplete AIS messages.
Additionally, the number of affected transmitters sending unknown values of ROT
and HDG in relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages in harbour
area is presented in Figure 3.
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In the sea areas, approximately 92% of the messages are unaffected. The highest
occurrence of unknown values was observed for ROT (about 5%) and HDG (about
4%). The navigation status is affected in about 2% of readings.
At speeds lower than 1 kn only a small number of vessels (less than 1%) is respon-
sible for 25% of unknown values of ROT and 36% of unknown values of HDG
(Figure 4). Additionally, a number of affected transmitters for unknown values for
ROT (left) and HDG (right) in relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages
in sea area are presented in Figure 5.
As the importance of AIS in everyday navigation increases, it has become clear that
AIS data may not contain all the information necessary to properly support decision
Figure 2. Histogram of the distribution of unknown values of ROT (left) and HDG (right) in
relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages in harbour area.
Figure 1. Investigation areas of AIS data reliability.
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Figure 4. Histogram of the distribution of unknown values of ROT (left) and HDG (right) in
relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages in sea area.
Figure 3. Number of affected transmitters sending unknown values of ROT (left) and HDG (right)
in relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages in harbour area.
Figure 5. Number of affected transmitters for unknown values for ROT (left) and HDG (right) in
relation to discrete arrays of SOG for Class A messages in sea area.
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making on the bridge. Very similar investigation results were presented by Felski and
Jaskólski (2013) for the Gulf of Gdan ́sk. The investigated area with recorded data is
presented in Figure 6.
The studies of AIS incompleteness were performed on the basis of recorded mes-
sages in txt files by means of a receiver situated in Gdynia. Each data set recorded
to a file was treated as a series. Analyses were made on the basis of the statistical
methods for every seven days. Data were recorded from 4 April 2006 to 8 January
2012 (selected 54 weeks ‐ 378 days). Assessment of HDG and ROT incompleteness in-
formation was carried out in Message group 1, 2 and 3 according to ITU-R M. 1371
(2010) and is presented in Table 1.
The number of incomplete messages during 24-hour recording for selected data
components is presented in Figure 7. It is easy to observe that the most incomplete
data are ROT and HDG during hourly investigations.
3. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF INTEGRITY AND COMPLETENESS
OF AIS INFORMATION. The quality of AIS information is a subject of interest
for many researchers. In the available publications, authors described results of
studies on completeness of AIS information derived from vessels. Furthermore, the
availability of AIS service and coverage area of AIS was modelled by Aarsaether
Figure 6. Area of investigation in the Gulf of Gdańsk with the tracks of AIS ships.
Table 1. Summary of ranges of correct and incorrect data for HDG and ROT (ITU-R M. 1371, 2010).
Selected components of dynamic and static data Correct value Incorrect value
TRUE HEADING [0; 359] 511
RATE OF TURN ±127 128
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andMoan (2009) and Hammond and Peters (2012), but in the reference literature there
are no studies of AIS information integrity available. Usually, the results published by
researchers refer to completeness of AIS dynamic and static information. It was there-
fore assumed that the methods known from the theory of reliability characteristics
would determine the integrity and completeness of AIS information. For the purposes
of this study, it is proposed to define the term as follows:
Completeness of AIS information: For the purpose of this paper, authors characterised com-
pleteness as the degree of compatibility of AIS information received by users of the system
with the message content specific to the system in accordance with the specifications ITU-
R M.1371, for any given point within the service volume. In case of completeness, the lack
of system usability was described as the incompleteness of AIS message No. 1, 5. The mean-
ingful representation of AIS completeness is the limiting value that is defined as a complete-
ness coefficient with the exponential life and failure time distributions.
Completeness of the information is identified with AIS information system
availability. If we consider the navigational structure of a system operating in time,
then X1, X2, X3, … Xn will be the working time and Y1, Y2, Y3, … Yn will be the
time of failure (Specht, 2003). The moments Z′n =X1+Y1+X2+Y2+…+Yn−1+Xn,
n = 1, 2, …, N are moments of failures and Z″n = Z′n+Yn are moments of renewal.
In addition, X1, Y1, i = 1, 2,… are independent and the working times and times of
failures have the same distributions. The working state is binary 2, the state of
failure is binary 1. A graphic representation of AIS data completeness is presented
in Figure 8.
The reliability structure of AIS may be defined by interval time between two con-
secutive AIS reports, which decide about its state. Let β(t) be the binary interpretation
Figure 7. Hourly outcomes of incomplete VDM messages for selected AIS data components.
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of the completeness state of the process.
β tð Þ ¼ 2;Z
00
n  t  Z0nþ1
1;Z0nþ1  Z00nþ1 for n ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . .N

ð1Þ
The state β(t) = 2 means that in the moment t the information of position report or
static data or voyage related data are correct according to ITU-R M.1371. The infor-
mation system is in the working state. In the opposite case β(t) = 2, the information of
position report or static data or voyage related data are incorrect according to ITU-R
M.1371. The information system is in the state of failure.
Assessment of the dynamic information integrity may be carried out in the message
group 1, 2 and 3 and separately in message group 5. Message No. 1 provides infor-
mation on navigation status, position, SOG, COG, ROT and HDG. Summary of
the range of valid data and the value indicating incomplete data is presented in
ITU-R M. 1371 (2010).
Message No. 5 contains static information: MMSI number, IMO number, call sign,
ship name, type of vessel and its cargo, Voyage Related Data: draft and the port of des-
tination. Summary of the range of valid data is shown in ITU-R M.1371.
If
CM ¼
X1 þ X2 þ X3 þ : : : þ Xn
n
X1 þ X2 þ X3 þ : : : þ Xn
n
þ Y1 þ Y2 þ Y3 þ : : : þ Yn
n
ð2Þ
then:
E Xð Þ ¼ X1 þ X2 þ X3 þ : : : þ Xn
n
ð3Þ
and
E Yð Þ ¼ Y1 þ Y2 þ Y3 þ : : : þ Yn
n
ð4Þ
where E(X) is the expected value of lifetime and E(Y) is the expected value of failure
time.
Figure 8. Graphic presentation of completeness of AIS data (Specht C., 2003).where: CM(t) –
completeness of AIS data; β(t) – system state; X(n) – working time; Y(n) – time of failure.
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It was assumed that completeness:
CM ¼ EðXÞ
E Xð Þ þ EðYÞ ð5Þ
so completeness can be computed as the sum probabilities of events:
CM tð Þ ¼ P½β tð Þ ¼ 2 ð6Þ
Therefore completeness of AIS information CM can be written as follows:
CM ¼ lim
t!∞CM tð Þ ¼ limt!∞
1
E Xð Þ þ EðYÞ ∫
∞
0
R uð Þdu ð7Þ
and R(u) is the reliability function from:
∫
∞
0
R uð Þdu ¼ EðXÞ ð8Þ
According to its functionalities AIS can be characterised by an exponential distri-
bution of residence times of working and failure states due to the “memoryless”.
Completeness of AIS data has an exponential distribution, if the density function of
the random variable T – Time to Failure (TTF) is given by:
f tð Þ ¼ λe
λt t> 0
0 t  0;

ð9Þ
Then, cumulative distribution function of the random variable T (TTF) is given by:
F tð Þ ¼ 1 e
λt; t> 0
0; t  0

ð10Þ
F tð Þ ¼ 1 e
μt; t> 0
0; t  0

ð11Þ
where F(t) is the distribution of working time, G(t) is the distribution of failure time,
λ is the failure rate and μ is the renewal rate.
From the properties of the exponential distribution:
Eexp Xið Þ ¼ 1
λ;
ð12Þ
Eexp Yið Þ ¼ 1
μ
ð13Þ
where Eexp(Xi) is the expected value of the exponential life distribution and Eexp(Yi) is
the expected value of the exponential failure distribution.
The operating time of the information delivered via AIS is characterised by the
exponential distributions of the lifetime and the time of failures. Therefore, according
to availability definition, the completeness is defined as follows:
CMexpðtÞ ¼ μ
λþ μþ
λ
λþ μþ e
 λþμð Þt ð14Þ
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Finally, we obtain (Specht, 2003):
CMexp ¼
1
λ
1
λ
þ 1
μ
¼ μ
μþ λ : ð15Þ
This is a new research approach. Parametric assessment of information completeness
will depend on recorded messages from ships. Moreover, it is self-evident that:
ICMexp ¼ 1 CMexp ð16Þ
where ICMexp is the incompleteness coefficient with an exponential distribution.
On the basis of the recorded data, during 24-hour recordings we can estimate
moments of received complete and incomplete data. Then, on the basis of daily re-
search scores we calculate weekly research outcomes. Each file record is treated as a
series, however, to obtain reliable statistical results a group series was analysed. AIS
information recorded for 378 days was used for completeness research.
CM t1; t2ð Þ ¼
Pn
i¼1 CMnðtÞ
n
ð17Þ
where CM(t1,t2) is the average completeness of AIS data in the interval [t1, t2] and
CM(t)n is the completeness of AIS data, where n is the number of week.
It is possible to calculate:
CM t1; t2ð Þ ¼ 1t2  t1 ∫
t2
t1
CM tð Þdt ð18Þ
Integrity of AIS information: According to the Federal Radio-navigation Plan (2005) integrity
is the measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by
a navigation system. Integrity includes the ability of the system to provide timely warnings to
users when the system should not be used for navigation. In this paper authors consider the
integrity as a measure of confidence in derived information of received AIS messages. This
measure will be expressed by statistical methods.
To estimate AIS integrity information, the recorded data were compared with the
ships database, received from the Maritime Office in Gdynia, which contains infor-
mation about 6265 vessels.
To calculate integrity coefficient, the number of received VHF Data Link Message
(VDM) lines as well as the number of ships during daily recordings were estimated.
Therefore the integrity of AIS data for six variables was calculated according to the
following formula:
a. Criterion of “lines”
Iðt1;t2Þ ¼ number of VDM correct data for selected componentnumber of opportunities for error VDM data ð19Þ
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b. Criterion of “ships”
Iðt1;t2Þ ¼ number of vessels transmiting VDM correct data for selected componentnumber of vessels during daily recording
ð20Þ
The investigation results of ROT and HDG data incompleteness are presented in
Figures 9 and 10.
Detailed analysis of the information was excluded from further examination of the
information transmitted by ships observed in port if the SOG was less than 4 knots.
The results of the study, obtained through filtering of the data used for incompleteness
analysis, are presented below.
It is clear to observe, that the quantity of incomplete information of HDG and ROT
from the harbour area was larger than the one from the sea area. In addition, the im-
provement of completeness data related to sea area was observed in November 2006.
Figure 9 and 10 present data related to the number of incomplete AIVDM lines (“lines
criterion”) received by AIS users in the area. Data distribution depends on the fre-
quency of information transmission that varies between ships. Additionally, some
ships still navigate in the same region. This ship transmits incorrect data. It can be
the reason for the disproportionate results.
Another approach is the criterion of “ships”, which relates data to the number of
ships responsible for incomplete HDG and ROT information. The investigation out-
comes are presented in Figures 11 and 12.
Figure 9. Incompleteness coefficients of HDG data in sea and harbour areas for all received data.
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Figure 10. Incompleteness coefficients of ROT data in sea and harbour areas for all received data.
Figure 11. IncompletenesscoefficientofHDGinformationinrelationtoships inseaandharbourareas.
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Information comparison shows much greater values of incompleteness observed for
the “ships criterion” than for the “lines criterion”. The difference is related to the time
interval of transmitting incomplete data by ships.
Significant improvement of AIS information quality was observed during the fol-
lowing years. Comparison of investigated data for 2006 and 2010–2012 shows that
incompleteness coefficient was less than 0·10 for HDG and ROT data for the “ships
criterion” (Figures 13 and 14).
Analysis of the contents of the Position Report for the criterion “lines” in the Gulf of
Gdan ́sk area found that 16% of messages lack the information concerning HDG.
Message incompleteness was reported in 14% if ships moved at a speed of less than
4 knots. However, up to 12% from the group of incomplete messages came from
ships located at the area of ports of Gdynia and Gdan ́sk, while 2% of incomplete
data came from ships located at sea.
For the criterion “ships”, after data filtering: 20·5% of the vessels transmitted
messages lacking HDG, 19·5% was related to the ships travelling at a speed of less
than 4 knots, and 15% of ships were located in the area of the ports of Gdynia and
Gdan ́sk.
At least 17% of messages for the criterion of “lines” contained incomplete ROT
information. However, up to 15% of messages were from the ships located in the
port area and their speed was less than 4 knots. On the other hand, for the criterion
of “ships”, such a state was represented by 17% of vessels located in ports of
Gdynia, Gdańsk and moving slower than 4 knots, whereas 22% of all vessels sent
Figure 12. Incompleteness coefficient of ROT information in relation to ships in sea and harbour
area.
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Figure 13. Incompleteness coefficients of HDG transmitted by ships in sea and harbour areas for
period December 2010 to January 2011.
Figure 14. Incompleteness coefficients of ROT transmitted by ships in sea and harbour areas for
period December 2010 to January 2011.
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incomplete messages of ROT in area of Gulf of Gdan ́sk. The results of incompleteness
of Heading and Rate of Turn data in the Gulf of Gdan ́sk, recorded by means of AIS
from April 2006 to January 2013 are shown in Figure 15.
The research results give a reasonable proof of the possibilities for the use of AIS
information in collision avoidance. In addition, it seems preferable to use the
dynamic information derived from GNSS receivers. It is considered to use the position
information derived from GNSS receivers to acquire the movement elements and de-
termine the Closest Point of Arrival (CPA) and Time to Closest Point of Arrival
(TCPA) of objects.
4. THE STUDY OF AIS INFORMATION QUALITY AS A POTENTIAL
SOURCE OF SUPPLEMENTARYARPA INFORMATION. On the basis of the
above presented method, additional dynamic information was discussed as a potential
source of supplementary information in collision avoidance. As HDG and ROT data
was discussed above, now only position, SOG and COG will be discussed. These data
types are derived fromGNSS. A summary of the range of valid data and the value indi-
cating incomplete data is shown in Table 2.
Figure 15. IncompletenessofAISdynamicdataintheGulfofGdańsk(fromApril2006toJanuary2013).
Table 2. Summary of ranges of correct and incorrect data in the message No. 1 (ITU-R M. 1371, 2010)
Selected components of dynamic data Correct value Incorrect value
LONGITUDE ±180 181
LATITUDE ±90 91
SOG 0–1022 1023
COG 0–3599 3600
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For this purpose, the Polish Naval Academy used a Class A SAAB R4 AIS receiver.
Preliminary results of research completeness of selected dynamic AIS information are
presented in Figures 16, 17 and 18.
The statistical analysis of AIS information completeness: geographic position, based
on 24-hour distribution for each seven days, its mean completeness, minimum,
maximum and standard deviation from 12 December 2011 to 1 January 2012 are pre-
sented in Table 3. It is clearly visible (Figures 16 to 18), that AIS data completeness
coefficient improved in 2010.
The results for the criterion of “lines” and the criterion of “ships” provide a high
completeness coefficient. For the criterion “lines” and criterion “ships”, the differences
in coefficient completeness of the different measurement series are in the range of
(0, 0·0763). High value of information completeness for the geographical position
with low values of standard deviations and errors indicate the potential use of this in-
formation in anti-collision applications. In further studies, analysis of the completeness
of SOG and COG has been omitted. This is the information that comes from the
GNSS receiver. Furthermore, studies of these variables are similar to the results for
the geographical positions.
Graphical presentation of cumulative distribution for the completeness exponential
of AIS data CM exp(t), for the “lines” criterion and for the criterion of “ships” are
shown in Figure 19. λ is the failure rate and CM.exp(t) is the completeness exponential
of AIS data.
Figure 16. Geographical position coefficients of AIS data completeness.
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Figure 17. Speed over ground coefficients of AIS data completeness.
Figure 18. Course over ground coefficients of AIS data completeness.
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Cumulative distribution for the completeness exponential of AIS data: geographic
position was determined in accordance with assumption of system working time
(Time To Failure), with the use of 9072 hours of recorded data. The completeness cri-
teria of AIS data, not presented in Tables 1 and 2, are presented in Table 4.
The integrity of AIS information is a separate issue that requires special attention in
the case of AIS data application in collision avoidance. The results of research of AIS
completeness and integrity information are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Each table
shows cumulative analysis of completeness and integrity information and is based
on research carried out from April 2006 to January 2012.
According to the results of research presented above the highest completeness coef-
ficients are: geographic position, MMSI number, Call Sign and Ship Name–between
0.9867 to 0.9999, whereas the lowest completeness coefficient was observed for naviga-
tional status (0.9633 when criterion of “ships”).
The integrity coefficient reached the highest value for: IMO number and Call Sign.
The lowest value of coefficient was observed for navigation status. It was found that the
information unfitness was caused mainly by human error i.e. AIS receiver operators
and installers.
Number of vessels transmitting incomplete or unreliable messages is not equal to the
number of incomplete and unreliable communications. The difference stems from the
Figure 19. Cumulative distribution for the completeness of AIS data: geographic position left:
criterion of “lines”, right: criterion of “ships”.
Table 3. The statistical analysis of AIS information completeness: geographic position, based on 24-hour
distribution for each seven days.
GEOGRAPHIC
POSITION
criterion of “lines” criterion of “ships”
DATE CM
(t1, t2)
δ CMmax
(t1, t2)
CMmin
(t1, t2)
CM
(t1, t2)
δ CMmax
(t1, t2)
CMmin
(t1, t2)
2011-12-12/18 0·9999 0·0001 1 0·9999 0·9976 0·0059 1 0·9880
2011-12-19/25 0·9999 0·0001 1 0·9999 0·9977 0·0045 1 0·9887
2011-12-26/01 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
2012-01-02/08 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Mean value: 0·9986 0·0011 0·9996 0·8649 0·9867 0·0074 0·9953 0·9765
Where: CM(t1, t2) – completeness of AIS information, based on 24-hour distribution for each seven days.
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variable interval data transmitted by the on board AIS. These differences can be seen
by comparing the results in tables above and Figure 20.
5. SUMMARY. This paper presents an overview of the results of AIS information
analysis as a potential source of supplementary ARPA information in collision avoid-
ance. Investigation was conducted in the Baltic Sea at the Gulf of Gdańsk and east of
Bornholm. The data collected in both areas have similar values that prove the
Table 6. Synthesis of the results for integrity of AIS information components.
CM(t1, t2) δ CM(t1, t2) δ
Variable criterion of “lines” criterion of “ships”
Navigation Status 0·8534 0·0505 0·7952 0·0561
MMSI 0·9132 0·0144 0·9005 0·0142
IMO number 0·9086 0·0127 0·8979 0·0125
Call Sign 0·9107 0·0131 0·9005 0·0128
Ship Name 0·8646 0·0147 0·8556 0·0135
Ship Type 0·7751 0·0189 0·7626 0·0159
Table 5. Synthesis of the results for completeness of AIS information components.
CM(t1, t2) δ CM(t1, t2) δ
criterion of “lines” criterion of “ships”
HDG 0·9783 0·0118 0·9436 0·0214
ROT 0·9755 0·0125 0·9316 0·0246
navigational status 0·9217 0·0199 0·9633 0·0101
geographic position 0·9986 0·0011 0·9867 0·0074
SOG 0·9964 0·0028 0·9576 0·0149
COG 0·9961 0·0033 0·9539 0·0154
MMSI number 0·9999 0·0001 0,9999 0·0001
IMO number 0·9932 0·0011 0·9521 0·0147
Call Sign 0·9996 0·0001 0·9953 0·0032
Ship name 0·9999 0·0001 0·9991 0·0008
Draught 0·9950 0·0010 0·9475 0·0120
Port Destination 0·9940 0·0011 0·9384 0·0142
Table 4. Summaryof ranges of correct and incorrect data in the message No. 1 and 5 (ITU-R |M. 1371, 2010)
Selected components of dynamic and static data Correct value β(t) = 2 Incorrect value β(t) = 1
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS 0–14 15
USER ID MMSI 9 marks [0–9] 0
IMO NUMBER 1–999999999 0
CALL SIGN from 1 to 7 ASCII marks @@@@@@@
SHIP NAME from 1 to 20 ASCII marks 20 marks @
TYPE OF SHIPAND CARGO 1–255 0
MAXIMUM PRESENT STATIC DRAUGHT 1–255 0
DESTINATION from 1 to 20 ASCII marks 20 marks @
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correctness of the results. The research outcomes presented in the paper lead to the
conclusion that AIS could deliver useful supplementary information in the process
of collision avoidance. This information is a reliable source of data, especially in the
context of SOG and COG. Additionally, AIS can deliver information about the
HDG changes and ROT without delay. The problem of position accuracy was
omitted in the article, since the study relates to the navigation characteristics of GNSS.
In addition the authors proposed the concept of defining completeness and integrity
of AIS information.
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